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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
highways, as in the principal case, its extent must be more
limited than if sustained on the broader theories above suggested. For example, can a requirement that a contract
carrier furnish a bond and insurance to cover injuries to
goods in transit be sustained as a provision for the preservation of the highways?"0 The aura of uncertainty still
hovers over contract carrier legislation and any further or
novel method of regulation will have to run the gauntlet
until the Supreme Court makes a more definite pronouncement delineating the penumbra of valid regulation.
F. E. Reader.

SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES IN EQUITY
IN PENNSYLVANIA
"Vigilanibus, non dormientibus subveniunt leges"
("Equity serves the vigilant, and not those who sleep upon
their rights"). It was said by Lord Cadman in a famous
English case, "A court of equity has always refused its aid
to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his rights,
and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can
call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith
and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting the
court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are
always discountenanced and therefore, from the beginning
40

The causal connection between compulsory insurance and preservation of the highways is probably no more remote than the fixing of
rates. Any regulation of a contract carrier could conceivably tend to
discourage his entry into the business and thus divert traffic from the
highways. Carried to its ultimate conclusion the doctrine would seem
to permit a requirement that the contract motor carrier must serve all.
Yet the rule of the Duke and Frost cases plainly forbids that, for that
would be converting a private carrier into a common carrier. Somewhere between the regulations of the Texas statute and complete commission control, the line must be drawn.
13 Bro. C. C. 640.
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of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in
this court."
The doctrine of laches is in the nature of a limitation
to the right to pursue a remedy in courts of equity. It is
synonymous with "remissness", "dilatoriness", "unreasonable or unexpected delay", and means a want of activity
and diligence in making a claim or moving for the enforcement of a right in equity.
Laches does more than raise a bar to a remedy as do
the statutes of limitations on the law side of the courts. It
destroys both the right and the remedy. As we know,
statutes of limitations are those legislative enactments
which prescribe the period of time after which certain
actions can not be brought or certain legal rights enforced.2
While the statute of limitations affects the remedy only and
not the right, 3 nevertheless, the passage of a given period
of time will, without more, give the defendant an effective
defense in an action at law. On the other hand, a litigant
in equity may have so neglected to assert his right that by
operation of the doctrine of laches he loses it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated the
reason on which the rule is based as being:
1-

-

-

not alone the lapse of time during

which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but
the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect, In
other words, where a court of equity finds that the
position of the parties has so changed that the equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice
or that intervening rights of third persons may be
destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its
one from the conequitable powers in order to 'save
'4
sequences of his own neglect.
The application of the doctrine of laches in a given
situation is frequently a major question for the court.
While laches may not' be imputed to the Federal Gov23 Blackstone's Commentaries 306.
sMichigan Bank v. Eldred, 130 U. S. 693.
4Penn Mutual Insurance Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685.
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ernment,5 it may be asserted against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and its municipal sub-divisions. In Bradford
v.New York 6 Pennsylvania Telephone 6 Telegraph CompanyA, the court said:
"While the authorities with us are not numerous
in holding that laches may be imputed to the Commonwealth and municipalities in denying them equitable
"relief which might otherwise be granted, the rule that
it can be imputed to the public is clearly laid down in
several cases. 'Laches may be imputed to the Commonwealth as well as to an individual': Com. v. Bala
6 Bryn Mawr Turnpike Co. 153 Pa. 47".7
The court may of its own accord find laches though the
defense is not raised by the respondent. For example in
Clark v.Edwards8 the court said:
"The defense of laches may be enforced in proper
cases wherein the facts appearing call for it, whether
they arise upon the bill and pleadings or upon the
whole case as presented by the evdence. The court
will often take notice of it even though the objection
is not made by the parties." (Citing cases.)
The key to the problem so far as the chancellor is concerned is whether there has been a change of condition of
the defendant so that it would be inequitable to grant the
relief sought. Thus, it is not so much whether a certain
period of time has elapsed since the plaintiff's right accrued,
but whether the plaintiff's lack of diligence in asserting his
The
claim has produced this change of circumstance.
courts of equity do not disregard the statutes of limitations
applicable to claims at law, however, but use them in their
discretion as standards, applying them in proper cases by

way of analogy. Thus, in Dalzell v.Lewis," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
SU. S. v. Dalles Road Co., 140 U. S. 599.
6206 Pa. 582 at 586.
7
See also Bailey's Estate, 241 Pa. 230 at 232.
858 Pa. Super. Ct. 456, at 460.
9252 Pa. 283 at 287.
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"While a court of equity is not bound by the
statute of limitations, it will frequently adopt and apply
the statute to corresponding rights and remedies as in
a court of law - - -- ; and will refuse relief to parties
who have slept upon their rights or have been negligent
in asserting them."
Where the right in suit is one over which both law and
equity have concurrent jurisdiction, the statute will be applied in equity and at law with equal force. 10 The federal
courts regard the statutes of limitations as raising presumptions in this respect:
"When a suit is brought within the time fixed by
the analogous statute, the burden is on the defendant
to show either from the face of the bill or by his answer, that extraordinary circumstances exist which
require the application of the doctrine of laches; and,
when such a suit is brought after the statutory time has
elapsed, the burden is on the complainant to show by
suitable averments in his bill, that it would be inequitable to apply it to his case.""
Frequently the theory of laches is confused with the
theory of "stale demands". The latter term connotes great
lapse of time,1 2 but laches need not be long continued. The
essence of laches is change of circumstances, rather than
duration of time. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
Hansell v. Downing,"3 states the rule as follows:
"Laches is not to be imputed to a party from the
mere lapse of time alone: it is an implied waiver, arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an
acquiescence in them. The question is one involving
equitable principles and is determinable from the particular facts in each case." (Italics ours).
In determining whether the complainant is barred in
his action by laches there are many elements to consider.
"In such cases the lapse of time during which the plaintiff
has knowingly and without reasonable excuse neglected or
10Altoona Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 203 Pa. 102.
""Kelly v. Boetcher, 85 Fed. 55, at 62.
' 2Ashurst v. Peck, 101 Ala. 499, 14 Southern 541.
117 Pa. Super. Ct. 235 at 240.
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omitted to assert his right, is to be considered in connection
with the general nature of the proceeding, the nature of the
transaction involved, the remedy at law, the altered conditions, if any, and all the attendant circumstances . . . -14
Other elements to be considered are the duration of the delay in asserting the claim, 15 which includes the question
of reasonableness of delay; the sufficiency of the excuse
offered in extenuation of the delay;16 whether during the
delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or
become inaccessible;'7 whether the conditions have so
changed as to render the enforcement of the right inequitable;", whether third persons have acquired intervening
rights;1- the nature of the duty or obligation sought to be
enforced;2 0 whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession
the
of the property in suit during the delay; 1 and whether
22
did.
he
than
sooner
act
to
opportunity
an
had
plaintiff
But the question of change of condition has the most
vital effect upon the outcome. "Equity will not relieve a
party-when his application for relief is postponed to a
time when it is beyond his power to restore to the other
party the situation he occupied before the contract was entered into." An excellent illustration of the application
of these equitable principles in practical affairs is afforded
in the law of nuisances and their attempted restraint. In the
case of Harris v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 23 the Supreme
Court said:
"In the present case, the question is, Did plaintiffs,
by waiting eight years before instituting these proceed' 4Youse v. McCarthy, 51 Pa. Super. Ct., 306, 311.
15Mellish's Estate, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 482.
16Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482.
17N. Y. Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359; McBrann v. Hopkins,
291 Pa. 574; Sebring v. Sebring, 43 N. J. Eq. 59, 10 Ad. 193; In re
Ridgway, 206 Pa. 587.
18
Felin v. Futcher, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 233.
-sPottsville Bank v. Minersville Water Co., 211 Pa. 566.
20In re Hoerr, 31 Pitts. Leg. Journal N. S. 337.
21Master v. Roberts, 244 Pa. 342.
22Gallaher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368.
232304 Pa. 550 at 555.
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ings, place defendant in such position that it would now
be inequitable to the latter to grant the injunction? It
is to be remembered that 'relief by injunction is not
controlled by arbitrary or technical rules but the application for its exercise is addressed to the conscience
and sound discretion of the court. Where a party
seeks the intervention of a court of equity to protect his
rights by injunctions, the application must be seasonably made, or the rights may be lost, at least so far as
equitable intervention is concerned. It is a rule practically without exception that a court of equity will not
grant relief by injunction where the party seeking it,
being cognizant of his rights, does not take those steps
to assert them which are open to him, but lies by and
suffers his adversary to incur expenses and enter into
burdensome engagements which would render the
granting of an injunction against the completion of his
undertaking, or the use thereof when completed, a great
injury to him': Stewart Wire Co. v. Lehigh Coal 6
Navigation Co., 203 Pa. 474.
"An examination of the record shows plaintiff's
eight-year delay in bringing this action has rendered it
impossible for a court of equity to grant the relief
prayed for without imposing great and inequitable
hardship and injury upon defendant, The record
shows that plaintiffs have been fully cognizant of the
damage caused them by blowing silt since 1918."
In the above mentioned case, the court affirmed the
action of the lower court in refusing to grant relief because
of laches. The plaintiffs in their bill in equity praying for
equitable relief by way of injunction alleged that coal silt
or fine dust was carried by the wind from the defendant's
culm banks to and upon the plaintiffs' greenhouses. The
evidence disclosed that the plaintiffs had been raising flowers at this point since 1897. The colliery of the defendant
was located upon adjacent coal lands which it purchased in
1917, and which had been operated for more than 40 years
prior thereto by defendant's predecessors in title. It was
also shown that there were large culm banks on this tract
before the first greenhouses of the plaintiffs were erected.
The plaintiffs first discovered that silt and fine material
were being carried by the wind from the defendant's culm
banks in 1918 and, complained to defendant in 1918 and
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again in 1923. The defendant company neither gave nor
promised relief to the plaintiffs. In denying relief to the
plaintiffs the court said:
"Whatever the merit of the plaintiffs' case was in
1918 when the silt began to be carried by wind into
plaintiffs' property, we are now faced with th- fact that
they have waited eight years before asking for relief.
Accordingly we pass directly to the controlling question of laches. If it must be decided against plaintiffs,
this decision renders unnecessary discussion of other
issues here involved."
In holding the plantiffs guilty of laches the court further said:
"We agree with the lower court that if the expense
to which defendant would be put would be the same
at the present time as a determination of the difficulties
between the parties would have entailed in 1918, the
defense of laches would fall. The expense however
has been greatly increased by the delay. This delay
has placed defendant in a position that, to grant the
injunction now, would cause it added expense and
great injury, as it would be obliged to bear not only the
considerable expense already incurred in depositing the
silt, which might have been sold and shipped immediately, where it has been placed from time to time since
1918, but the additional expense of its removal. Had
plaintiffs legally asserted their rights at the time the
silt banks first became an annoyance to them, a great
part of the expense necessary to remove the trouble
would have been avoided and their damage very much
lessened."
The court shows very clearly that passage of time
alone is not the controlling feature:
"Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & M[g. Co., 293
Pa. 152, urged by plaintiffs in support of their contention that relief should not be withheld on the basis of
laches, is not in point, as an examination of that decision shows the fourteen months' delay there involved
did not, unlike the present one, increase defendant's
burden in removing the offending matter complained
of. In Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa.
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540, also a 'dust case' there was no such harmful delay as is here involved."
Another case arising out of an attempt to restrain an
alleged nuisance was Quinn v. American Spiral Spring Co.24
In that case. plaintiff sought to restrain defendant from operating large and heavy pieces of machinery on adjacent
property which caused such noise and vibration that plaintiff was no longer able to live in his home. In 1919, the
plaintiff had purchased his home and in 1924 the defendants
bought a vacant lot adjoining thereto for the purpose of
building a plant for manufacturing iron and steel springs.
The plaintiff was warned by defendants of their intention
to build such a plant as would cause noise and vibration.
The defense of laches was raised but the court refused to
recognize it. The basis of the decision appears to be that
the defendants' position had not changed by reason of delay of the plaintiff. Said the court:
"Nor is plaintiff to be deprived of relief because
of his alleged laches. If we were deciding whether or
not defendants should have been permitted to erect and
operate the plant, much might be said in favor of the
contention that plaintiff was barred by his laches, for
he had sufficient knowledge, at the time of his first interview with defendants' president, to call upon him
to then object to the construction, if he intended to do
so. But the law is otherwise, where, as here, the available objection is only to the continued use of the improperly located machinery which causes the excess
injury. Where this was to be placed plaintiff did not
know at the time of that interview. As he had no
knowledge of defendants' wrongdoing until after the
plant had been constructed and was in operation, his
failure to immediately seek redress by legal proceedings cannot have harmed defendants, since 'laches will
not be imputed to a plaintiff, where no injury results
to defendant by reason of the delay': Montgomery
24293 Pa. 153.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Bros. v. Montgomery, 269 Pa. 332; Selmer v.Smith,
285 Pa. 67, 70. The nuisance in this case being of a
continuous and progressive character, equity has jurisdiction to compel defendants to right the wrong, before they continue operating the plant: Hustleton v.
Park, 256 Pa. 255; Gray v. Phila. 6 Reading Coal
Iron Co., 286 Pa. 11.'"
A comparison of these two cases emphasizes the distinction between mere duration of time and change of condition. The late Mr. Justice Sadler of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, whose opinions were always a clear and
25
simple statement of the law, said in McGrann v. Allen:
"Delay which injures no one will not furnish reason for refusing relief (Citing cases); but when by
reason of a failure to exercise due diligence the rights
of the parties have been adversely affected by reason
26
of altered circumstances the contrary is true.In every instance the matter is within the sound discretion of the chancellor. At the same time he must exercise that discretion in accordance with certain fixed principles. The phrase, "of grace", predicated of a decree in
equity, had its origin in an age when kings dispensed their
royal favors through their chancellors. Although it continues to be repeated occasionally, it has no rightful place
in the jurisprudence of a free commonwealth, and ought to
be relegated to the age in which it was appropriate. It has
25291 Pa. 574 at 578.
The following sentence from 10 Ruling Case Law 396 is significant: "Laches in legal significance is not mere delay but delay that works
disadvantage to another". See also, note in 6 A. L. R. 1098 entitled
26

"Effect of delay in seeking equitable relief against nuisance"; also, note

in 61 A. L. R. 924 at page 934 entitled "Doctrine of comparative injury in suit to enjoin nuisance". Other pertinent cases are Clark v.
Boyson, 39 Fed. (2d.) 800; Finch v. Barr, 132 Atl. 889 (Del.); Brink
v. Shepard, 184 N. W. 404, 18 A. L. R. 116; Hey v. Seifert, 123 Atl.
106 (N. J.); Van Courtland v. New York Ry. Co., 250 N. Y. S. 298;
Lowell v. Pendleton Co., 261 Pac. 415; McDonald v. Home Oil Corp.,
241 S. W. 274 (Tex.); Oliver v. Forney Oil Co., 226 S. W. 1094
(Tex.).
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been said that equity has its law as law has its equity. This
is another way of saying that equitable remedies are administered in accordance with rules as certain as human
wisdom can devise, leaving their application to the discretion of the chancellor in doubtful cases only. Even in
those cases the chancellor is charged with the duty of
balancing rights rather than permitted to grant favors "of
grace' '.27
Thus, the lawyer when confronted with a case of this
kind must examine the facts surrounding the defendant's
case with the same care as he examines those of his own client. Otherwise, how can he tell whether the delay of the
plaintiff, if any there be, has existed sufficiently long to have
allowed the defendant to have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of a change of position or condition?
Frank H. Strouss.
Former Judge of Northumberland County.

LIABILITY OF THEATER OWNERS FOR INJURIES
TO PATRONS ON THE PREMISES
(PENNSYLVANIA CASES)

It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania judiciary
did not enunciate the rule concerning liability of theater
owners for injuries sustained by patrons until 1926. Three
years prior to that time, the Superior Court, in the case of
Leckstein vs. Morris, 80 Pa. Super. 352, was confronted
with a case involving the liability of theater owners, but
the Court did not avail itself of the opportunity to expound
the applicable principles.
From the plaintiff's testimony in that case, it appeared
that she and her grandchild attended the defendant's
theater. Since the child had occasion to use the toilet, the
plaintiff made an inquiry of an attendant, who directed her
to the public lavatory in the basement. The steps were
27Sullivan v, Steel Co. 208 Pa. 540 at 554.

